30 results
Contributors
-
- By Mitchell Aboulafia, Frederick Adams, Marilyn McCord Adams, Robert M. Adams, Laird Addis, James W. Allard, David Allison, William P. Alston, Karl Ameriks, C. Anthony Anderson, David Leech Anderson, Lanier Anderson, Roger Ariew, David Armstrong, Denis G. Arnold, E. J. Ashworth, Margaret Atherton, Robin Attfield, Bruce Aune, Edward Wilson Averill, Jody Azzouni, Kent Bach, Andrew Bailey, Lynne Rudder Baker, Thomas R. Baldwin, Jon Barwise, George Bealer, William Bechtel, Lawrence C. Becker, Mark A. Bedau, Ernst Behler, José A. Benardete, Ermanno Bencivenga, Jan Berg, Michael Bergmann, Robert L. Bernasconi, Sven Bernecker, Bernard Berofsky, Rod Bertolet, Charles J. Beyer, Christian Beyer, Joseph Bien, Joseph Bien, Peg Birmingham, Ivan Boh, James Bohman, Daniel Bonevac, Laurence BonJour, William J. Bouwsma, Raymond D. Bradley, Myles Brand, Richard B. Brandt, Michael E. Bratman, Stephen E. Braude, Daniel Breazeale, Angela Breitenbach, Jason Bridges, David O. Brink, Gordon G. Brittan, Justin Broackes, Dan W. Brock, Aaron Bronfman, Jeffrey E. Brower, Bartosz Brozek, Anthony Brueckner, Jeffrey Bub, Lara Buchak, Otavio Bueno, Ann E. Bumpus, Robert W. Burch, John Burgess, Arthur W. Burks, Panayot Butchvarov, Robert E. Butts, Marina Bykova, Patrick Byrne, David Carr, Noël Carroll, Edward S. Casey, Victor Caston, Victor Caston, Albert Casullo, Robert L. Causey, Alan K. L. Chan, Ruth Chang, Deen K. Chatterjee, Andrew Chignell, Roderick M. Chisholm, Kelly J. Clark, E. J. Coffman, Robin Collins, Brian P. Copenhaver, John Corcoran, John Cottingham, Roger Crisp, Frederick J. Crosson, Antonio S. Cua, Phillip D. Cummins, Martin Curd, Adam Cureton, Andrew Cutrofello, Stephen Darwall, Paul Sheldon Davies, Wayne A. Davis, Timothy Joseph Day, Claudio de Almeida, Mario De Caro, Mario De Caro, John Deigh, C. F. Delaney, Daniel C. Dennett, Michael R. DePaul, Michael Detlefsen, Daniel Trent Devereux, Philip E. Devine, John M. Dillon, Martin C. Dillon, Robert DiSalle, Mary Domski, Alan Donagan, Paul Draper, Fred Dretske, Mircea Dumitru, Wilhelm Dupré, Gerald Dworkin, John Earman, Ellery Eells, Catherine Z. Elgin, Berent Enç, Ronald P. Endicott, Edward Erwin, John Etchemendy, C. Stephen Evans, Susan L. Feagin, Solomon Feferman, Richard Feldman, Arthur Fine, Maurice A. Finocchiaro, William FitzPatrick, Richard E. Flathman, Gvozden Flego, Richard Foley, Graeme Forbes, Rainer Forst, Malcolm R. Forster, Daniel Fouke, Patrick Francken, Samuel Freeman, Elizabeth Fricker, Miranda Fricker, Michael Friedman, Michael Fuerstein, Richard A. Fumerton, Alan Gabbey, Pieranna Garavaso, Daniel Garber, Jorge L. A. Garcia, Robert K. Garcia, Don Garrett, Philip Gasper, Gerald Gaus, Berys Gaut, Bernard Gert, Roger F. Gibson, Cody Gilmore, Carl Ginet, Alan H. Goldman, Alvin I. Goldman, Alfonso Gömez-Lobo, Lenn E. Goodman, Robert M. Gordon, Stefan Gosepath, Jorge J. E. Gracia, Daniel W. Graham, George A. Graham, Peter J. Graham, Richard E. Grandy, I. Grattan-Guinness, John Greco, Philip T. Grier, Nicholas Griffin, Nicholas Griffin, David A. Griffiths, Paul J. Griffiths, Stephen R. Grimm, Charles L. Griswold, Charles B. Guignon, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Dimitri Gutas, Gary Gutting, Paul Guyer, Kwame Gyekye, Oscar A. Haac, Raul Hakli, Raul Hakli, Michael Hallett, Edward C. Halper, Jean Hampton, R. James Hankinson, K. R. Hanley, Russell Hardin, Robert M. Harnish, William Harper, David Harrah, Kevin Hart, Ali Hasan, William Hasker, John Haugeland, Roger Hausheer, William Heald, Peter Heath, Richard Heck, John F. Heil, Vincent F. Hendricks, Stephen Hetherington, Francis Heylighen, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Risto Hilpinen, Harold T. Hodes, Joshua Hoffman, Alan Holland, Robert L. Holmes, Richard Holton, Brad W. Hooker, Terence E. Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Paul Horwich, Vittorio Hösle, Paul Hoβfeld, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard-Snyder, Anne Hudson, Deal W. Hudson, Carl A. Huffman, David L. Hull, Patricia Huntington, Thomas Hurka, Paul Hurley, Rosalind Hursthouse, Guillermo Hurtado, Ronald E. Hustwit, Sarah Hutton, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Harry A. Ide, David Ingram, Philip J. Ivanhoe, Alfred L. Ivry, Frank Jackson, Dale Jacquette, Joseph Jedwab, Richard Jeffrey, David Alan Johnson, Edward Johnson, Mark D. Jordan, Richard Joyce, Hwa Yol Jung, Robert Hillary Kane, Tomis Kapitan, Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, James A. Keller, Ralph Kennedy, Sergei Khoruzhii, Jaegwon Kim, Yersu Kim, Nathan L. King, Patricia Kitcher, Peter D. Klein, E. D. Klemke, Virginia Klenk, George L. Kline, Christian Klotz, Simo Knuuttila, Joseph J. Kockelmans, Konstantin Kolenda, Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Isaac Kramnick, Richard Kraut, Fred Kroon, Manfred Kuehn, Steven T. Kuhn, Henry E. Kyburg, John Lachs, Jennifer Lackey, Stephen E. Lahey, Andrea Lavazza, Thomas H. Leahey, Joo Heung Lee, Keith Lehrer, Dorothy Leland, Noah M. Lemos, Ernest LePore, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Isaac Levi, Andrew Levine, Alan E. Lewis, Daniel E. Little, Shu-hsien Liu, Shu-hsien Liu, Alan K. L. Chan, Brian Loar, Lawrence B. Lombard, John Longeway, Dominic McIver Lopes, Michael J. Loux, E. J. Lowe, Steven Luper, Eugene C. Luschei, William G. Lycan, David Lyons, David Macarthur, Danielle Macbeth, Scott MacDonald, Jacob L. Mackey, Louis H. Mackey, Penelope Mackie, Edward H. Madden, Penelope Maddy, G. B. Madison, Bernd Magnus, Pekka Mäkelä, Rudolf A. Makkreel, David Manley, William E. Mann (W.E.M.), Vladimir Marchenkov, Peter Markie, Jean-Pierre Marquis, Ausonio Marras, Mike W. Martin, A. P. Martinich, William L. McBride, David McCabe, Storrs McCall, Hugh J. McCann, Robert N. McCauley, John J. McDermott, Sarah McGrath, Ralph McInerny, Daniel J. McKaughan, Thomas McKay, Michael McKinsey, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ernan McMullin, Anthonie Meijers, Jack W. Meiland, William Jason Melanson, Alfred R. Mele, Joseph R. Mendola, Christopher Menzel, Michael J. Meyer, Christian B. Miller, David W. Miller, Peter Millican, Robert N. Minor, Phillip Mitsis, James A. Montmarquet, Michael S. Moore, Tim Moore, Benjamin Morison, Donald R. Morrison, Stephen J. Morse, Paul K. Moser, Alexander P. D. Mourelatos, Ian Mueller, James Bernard Murphy, Mark C. Murphy, Steven Nadler, Jan Narveson, Alan Nelson, Jerome Neu, Samuel Newlands, Kai Nielsen, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Carlos G. Noreña, Calvin G. Normore, David Fate Norton, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Donald Nute, David S. Oderberg, Steve Odin, Michael O’Rourke, Willard G. Oxtoby, Heinz Paetzold, George S. Pappas, Anthony J. Parel, Lydia Patton, R. P. Peerenboom, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Adriaan T. Peperzak, Derk Pereboom, Jaroslav Peregrin, Glen Pettigrove, Philip Pettit, Edmund L. Pincoffs, Andrew Pinsent, Robert B. Pippin, Alvin Plantinga, Louis P. Pojman, Richard H. Popkin, John F. Post, Carl J. Posy, William J. Prior, Richard Purtill, Michael Quante, Philip L. Quinn, Philip L. Quinn, Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Diana Raffman, Gerard Raulet, Stephen L. Read, Andrews Reath, Andrew Reisner, Nicholas Rescher, Henry S. Richardson, Robert C. Richardson, Thomas Ricketts, Wayne D. Riggs, Mark Roberts, Robert C. Roberts, Luke Robinson, Alexander Rosenberg, Gary Rosenkranz, Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal, Adina L. Roskies, William L. Rowe, T. M. Rudavsky, Michael Ruse, Bruce Russell, Lilly-Marlene Russow, Dan Ryder, R. M. Sainsbury, Joseph Salerno, Nathan Salmon, Wesley C. Salmon, Constantine Sandis, David H. Sanford, Marco Santambrogio, David Sapire, Ruth A. Saunders, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Charles Sayward, James P. Scanlan, Richard Schacht, Tamar Schapiro, Frederick F. Schmitt, Jerome B. Schneewind, Calvin O. Schrag, Alan D. Schrift, George F. Schumm, Jean-Loup Seban, David N. Sedley, Kenneth Seeskin, Krister Segerberg, Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Dennis M. Senchuk, James F. Sennett, William Lad Sessions, Stewart Shapiro, Tommie Shelby, Donald W. Sherburne, Christopher Shields, Roger A. Shiner, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert K. Shope, Kwong-loi Shun, Wilfried Sieg, A. John Simmons, Robert L. Simon, Marcus G. Singer, Georgette Sinkler, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Matti T. Sintonen, Lawrence Sklar, Brian Skyrms, Robert C. Sleigh, Michael Anthony Slote, Hans Sluga, Barry Smith, Michael Smith, Robin Smith, Robert Sokolowski, Robert C. Solomon, Marta Soniewicka, Philip Soper, Ernest Sosa, Nicholas Southwood, Paul Vincent Spade, T. L. S. Sprigge, Eric O. Springsted, George J. Stack, Rebecca Stangl, Jason Stanley, Florian Steinberger, Sören Stenlund, Christopher Stephens, James P. Sterba, Josef Stern, Matthias Steup, M. A. Stewart, Leopold Stubenberg, Edith Dudley Sulla, Frederick Suppe, Jere Paul Surber, David George Sussman, Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, Zeno G. Swijtink, Richard Swinburne, Charles C. Taliaferro, Robert B. Talisse, John Tasioulas, Paul Teller, Larry S. Temkin, Mark Textor, H. S. Thayer, Peter Thielke, Alan Thomas, Amie L. Thomasson, Katherine Thomson-Jones, Joshua C. Thurow, Vzalerie Tiberius, Terrence N. Tice, Paul Tidman, Mark C. Timmons, William Tolhurst, James E. Tomberlin, Rosemarie Tong, Lawrence Torcello, Kelly Trogdon, J. D. Trout, Robert E. Tully, Raimo Tuomela, John Turri, Martin M. Tweedale, Thomas Uebel, Jennifer Uleman, James Van Cleve, Harry van der Linden, Peter van Inwagen, Bryan W. Van Norden, René van Woudenberg, Donald Phillip Verene, Samantha Vice, Thomas Vinci, Donald Wayne Viney, Barbara Von Eckardt, Peter B. M. Vranas, Steven J. Wagner, William J. Wainwright, Paul E. Walker, Robert E. Wall, Craig Walton, Douglas Walton, Eric Watkins, Richard A. Watson, Michael V. Wedin, Rudolph H. Weingartner, Paul Weirich, Paul J. Weithman, Carl Wellman, Howard Wettstein, Samuel C. Wheeler, Stephen A. White, Jennifer Whiting, Edward R. Wierenga, Michael Williams, Fred Wilson, W. Kent Wilson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John F. Wippel, Jan Woleński, Allan B. Wolter, Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, Rega Wood, W. Jay Wood, Paul Woodruff, Alison Wylie, Gideon Yaffe, Takashi Yagisawa, Yutaka Yamamoto, Keith E. Yandell, Xiaomei Yang, Dean Zimmerman, Günter Zoller, Catherine Zuckert, Michael Zuckert, Jack A. Zupko (J.A.Z.)
- Edited by Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
-
- Book:
- The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy
- Published online:
- 05 August 2015
- Print publication:
- 27 April 2015, pp ix-xxx
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Humoral defence improvement and haematopoiesis stimulation in sows and offspring by oral supply of shark-liver oil to mothers during gestation and lactation
- Romain Mitre, Michel Etienne, Sophie Martinais, Henri Salmon, Patrick Allaume, Philippe Legrand, Alain B. Legrand
-
- Journal:
- British Journal of Nutrition / Volume 94 / Issue 5 / November 2005
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 08 March 2007, pp. 753-762
- Print publication:
- November 2005
-
- Article
-
- You have access Access
- Export citation
-
Shark-liver oil (SLO) contains two bioactive lipids: alkylglycerols and n-3 PUFA. Alkylglycerols have immunostimulating and haematopoietic properties, while n-3 PUFA are essential for optimal neonatal development. We investigated the beneficial effects of dietary supplementation with 32g SLO/d to twelve pregnant and then lactating sows (from day 80 of pregnancy to weaning) on the growth and immune status of their offspring, compared with a control group. Sows were vaccinated against Aujeszky's disease 21d before term. Blood samples were collected from sows before treatment, on delivery and 14d later, and from five piglets per litter on days 2, 21 and 36 after birth; colostrum and milk samples were collected 12h, 14 and 28d postpartum. Compared with controls, supplemented sows had higher levels of both erythrocytes and Hb in their blood, and higher concentrations of IgG, alkylglycerols and n-3 PUFA in their mammary secretions. In piglets from supplemented sows, leucocytes and IgG were higher. Supplementation with SLO resulted in an increase in Aujeszky antibodies in both blood and colostrum of sows after vaccination, together with an increase in Aujeszky antibodies in piglet blood. Our findings demonstrate that improvement of both passive and active immune status in piglets is related to the consumption of alkylglycerols associated with n-3 PUFA in the sow diet. The overall improvement in offspring health status by SLO supplementation to the mother could be of interest for optimisation of the lipid diet during and after pregnancy.
2 - Norway
-
- By Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle
- Edited by Neville Wylie, University of Nottingham
-
- Book:
- European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War
- Published online:
- 07 October 2011
- Print publication:
- 20 December 2001, pp 53-75
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
On Monday 8 April 1940 the Oslo newspaper Dagbladet carried a leading article protesting against the Allied decision, announced early that morning, to lay mines in Norwegian territorial waters. It was, the paper declared, one of the most serious blows inflicted on Norwegian interests since the beginning of the war: Norway must protest in the strongest possible terms against this violation of the country's neutrality. The late-afternoon edition of the paper carried new headlines: ‘100 armed German ships in Kattegat today, heading northward’; ‘Two mysterious sinkings off Lillesand’; ‘Koht to speak in Storting open session this evening.’ The Storting, the Norwegian parliament, met shortly after 5 o'clock and, after an opening statement by the foreign minister, Halvdan Koht, went into closed session to discuss the events of the last few days: the diplomatic notes of 5 April in which Britain and France reserved to themselves the right to take action – as yet unspecified – to prevent Germany from obtaining resources and facilities from Norway and Sweden; and the proclamation, issued early on the 8th, that mines were to be laid in three specified areas in order to force German shipping out of Norwegian waters and expose it to interception by the Royal Navy.
1 - The end of isolation: Scandinavia and the modern world
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 20-52
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Both geographically and in the European imagination, Scandinavia lies on the northern margin of Europe. Havelock Ellis conveyed a characteristic nineteenth-century image when he described Norway as ‘a land having, in its most characteristic regions, a year of but one day and night – the summer a perpetual warm sunlit day filled with the aroma of trees and plants, and the rest of the year a night of darkness and horror; a land which is on the extreme northern limit of European civilisation’. The facts of Scandinavian life are harsh by European standards: Scandinavia is ‘the western part of Siberia’. It is a Siberia tempered by the Gulf Stream, and this moderating influence has made civilised existence possible in such high latitudes for centuries. Nevertheless, until very recent times the physical environment imposed rigid constraints on human activity in the far north of Europe.
Since the resources which could be exploited by primitive technology were so meagre, much of the population lived on the very edge of subsistence. In the late nineteenth century the Scandinavian countries were still among the poorest in Europe in terms of per capita income. It is only within the last hundred years that the physical constraints have been decisively overcome through the application of modern technology to every field of activity: communications, housing, agriculture and extractive and manufacturing industry. The tyrannies of climate and terrain have to a large extent been overcome, but the habits of isolation and detachment have persisted into the late twentieth century. Scandinavians still feel different from, and sometimes superior to, other Europeans; the rest of Europe still takes notice of Scandinavia only intermittently.
Definitions
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp xv-xvi
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Frontmatter
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp i-viii
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
9 - Scandinavia and the coming of the Second World War 1933–1940
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 317-356
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The strategic plans produced by the great powers before the First World War were abstract, ambitious and largely unrealistic. When British, German and Soviet strategists returned after 1933 to consider the role of Scandinavia in a future war, they did so in the light of experience which their predecessors had lacked. There appear to have been no serious examinations of the possibility of military operations on Scandinavian territory of the kind which loomed so large in pre-1914 deliberations. The primary focus was on economic and naval warfare. For both Great Britain and Germany, the lesson of the last war was that economic pressure on Germany had been of decisive importance. Moreover, in the light of Germany's territorial losses after Versailles and the exploitation of new mineral resources in Scandinavia, it was reasonable to assume that Germany's economic dependence on indigenous Scandinavian products would be greater in both relative and absolute terms than it had been in 1914–18. Scandinavian resources would also be of great importance to Great Britain, but its geographical position, naval superiority, financial resources and world-wide empire would give Britain access to alternative sources of supply and the capacity to deny such access to Germany. Britain's principal aim in wartime would therefore be to enlist the Scandinavian countries in an economic blockade. Germany, by contrast, would require only business as usual.
The logic of British strategy meant not only that the machinery of economic warfare, with all that this implied for the Scandinavian neutrals, must be applied from the very outset, but also that neutrality itself was dispensable.
Map 2 - The Gulf of Finland
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp xxii-xxiii
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Epilogue
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 357-370
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
1939–1940: Looking backward
It was inevitable that at the beginning of the Second World War belligerents and neutrals alike should have looked to the past for guidance. The Allies entered the war committed to a strategy of ‘containment’. Over a period of up to three years, Germany would be worn down by ‘economic pressure combined with anti-Hitler propaganda’ while the Allies gradually built up their armaments to the point at which they could challenge the enemy in the field. As part of this strategy they began to negotiate war trade agreements with neutral governments. The Nordic countries, for their part, set in motion the machinery which would enable them either individually or – to a limited extent – collectively to resist economic pressure, while some of their citizens – a much larger and more heterogeneous group than in the last war – attempted to mediate between the belligerents. But the war did not develop as expected. There was no German offensive in the west, no aerial bombardment of the British Isles and no peace. This should have given the British and French governments confidence in their frequently repeated claim that ‘time was on our side’. In fact, by the end of 1939 their faith had begun to waver. Faced with no great military crises, the Allied governments' main task had become the irksome one of maintaining morale at home and prestige abroad while waiting for an increasingly improbable ‘collapse of the German home front’. They were thus susceptible to any suggestions – short of a direct assault on Germany – which might promise a speedy end to the war.
4 - Neutrality preserved: Scandinavia and the First World War
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 118-168
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Denmark, Norway and Sweden were more fortunate than most European countries in that they were not directly involved in hostilities between 1914 and 1918. Both the Entente and the Central Powers were persuaded that they had more to gain from Scandinavian neutrality than from drawing the Scandinavian states into the war. Scandinavia proved marginal to the military and naval strategies of the belligerents to an extent unforeseen by pre-war planners. This was partly because the war lasted longer than most people had anticipated: much pre-war planning had been predicated on the assumption of a war of early engagements and rapid movement both on land and at sea – particularly in Scandinavian waters. It was also because attempts to break the deadlock on the western front by a flanking strategy were directed elsewhere: towards the eastern Mediterranean, not the Baltic. And because the war was prolonged, economic pressure became increasingly important to both sides. This heightened the significance of neutral Scandinavia as a transit route to Germany and Russia and as a source of supply to the Entente and the Central Powers.
In some respects their economic indispensability was advantageous to the Scandinavian states, or at least to the many individuals and firms who made large profits out of trading with the belligerents. However, most of the problems that confronted Scandinavian governments during the war resulted directly or indirectly from the attempts of the belligerents to conscript the Scandinavian economies into their respective war efforts. All three countries had to accept a drastic diminution of traditional neutral rights while establishing an unprecedented degree of government control and supervision over their domestic economies.
6 - Confrontation and co-existence: Scandinavia and the great powers after the First World War
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 206-234
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Before 1914 Scandinavia had felt the repercussions of confrontation between the great powers without being the principal focus of their attention. The Nordic states were affected in a similarly indirect way by the changing international climate of the post-war period: first the transition from war to peace under the auspices of the treaty of Versailles; then, in the Locarno era after 1925, the emergence of a more equitable international order; finally, the onset of the great depression. But although the European powers rarely took a direct interest in Scandinavian affairs, their attention was drawn to northern Europe, especially in the early 1920s, by the persistent instability of the eastern Baltic.
After a period of active involvement with the newly independent states of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, Great Britain withdrew its naval presence from the eastern Baltic in 1921 but retained an interest in reducing friction among the states of the region – for example, between Poland and Lithuania over the disputed Vilnius territory – in the interests of European peace in general and as a bulwark against Bolshevik Russia. France was concerned much more overtly with the construction of a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism centred on Poland and the countries of the ‘Little Entente’, which also had Baltic ramifications. Russia and Germany, at whose expense the new order in eastern Europe had been constructed, had a shared interest in the demise of Poland, the largest of the new states, but were able to find a basis for co-existence with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Nevertheless, the long-term existence of these three small states was precarious and it was widely assumed that they must ultimately be reabsorbed by Russia.
3 - The war of the future: Scandinavia in the strategic plans of the great powers
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 83-117
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
This chapter is about a war that did not happen. It was a war of daring British assaults on Esbjerg and the Kiel Canal; of great naval battles in the entrances to the Baltic; of an Anglo-French drive from the German Baltic coast to Berlin; of a German–Swedish invasion of Finland, followed by an advance on St Petersburg. That this war existed only in the minds of politicians, publicists and naval and military planners is no reason why it should be ignored. Belief in the possibility of armed conflict in northern Europe reflected the fears produced by a period of profound international disturbance. It was also the result of attempts to come to terms with rapid changes in military technology, the implications of which could in many cases only be guessed at. Moreover, the implementation of ideas ventilated in the pre-1914 period was actively considered during the war itself.
Many of the plans for war in Scandinavia were expressions of institutional rivalries between the armed services of the great powers. Those produced by the British and German navies (discussed in the next two sections of this chapter) represented prolonged rearguard actions against the growing predominance of the military, and of the continental European theatre. Naval officers who favoured action in Scandinavia shared the common ‘ideology of the offensive’ but wished to see it directed towards a theatre where, they believed, their own country or their own branch held the strategic advantage. Army officers in Germany and, to an increasing extent, in Britain as well wanted to avoid any diversion of resources or effort from the western and eastern fronts where, they believed, the best prospects for a successful offensive lay.
List of abbreviations
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp xvii-xx
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
7 - Britain, Germany and the Nordic economies 1916–1936
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 235-273
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
The First World War demonstrated that economic and political power were inseparable. Just as economic resources were crucial to the military effort, so war could be used to advance the economic interests of the belligerents. In Britain, the immediate problem of enforcing the blockade of the Central Powers became overlaid with that of meeting the long-term challenge of German industry. From 1916 onwards, attempts were made to supplant German trade in markets where it had traditionally been dominant. Remarkable and sometimes ruthless efforts were made in the years 1918–21 to convert Britain's temporary commercial predominance, the result of abnormal postwar conditions, into something more permanent. The Nordic countries were a particular object of British interest as traditional German markets which had a strong growth potential in their own right, but they were also regarded as a transit route to the much larger market opportunities that were expected to materialise in post-revolutionary Russia.
By 1921 the impetus had waned and the British economy had relapsed into stagnation. But this early post-war phase foreshadowed the radical shift of policy which followed the abandonment of the gold standard and the adoption of tariff protection in 1931–2. This time there was a far more systematic employment of state power, through tariffs and trade bargaining, but again the Nordic countries were among the principal objects of attention. The depreciation of sterling, together with the bilateral trade agreements concluded in 1933 with Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, helped to make Scandinavia one of Britain's most important export markets by the mid-1930s. Achieved at a time of German weakness, this success was, however, to be undermined by the revival of German competition after 1933.
List of tables
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp xi-xii
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Index
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 400-421
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
Introduction
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 1-19
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Small states and great powers in the international system
The period bounded by the lapse of Bismarck's reinsurance treaty in 1890 and the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in 1940 was one in which the Nordic countries became enmeshed in international conflict to a degree unprecedented since the early nineteenth century. The progressive erosion of Scandinavian isolation, culminating in the traumatic years of war and occupation between 1939 and 1945 (from which only Sweden was spared), forms one of the main themes of this book. Another is the inability of the Nordic states to fulfil – either individually (apart, again, from Sweden) or collectively – one of the basic functions of any state: the protection of their citizens from external attack. There is another side to the story. Of the minor states of Europe, the Nordic countries were – and remain – among the most fortunate. They have enjoyed a large measure of internal stability and have had few rivalries among themselves. Rapid industrialisation, beginning in the nineteenth century, combined with periods of social democratic rule which were longer and more continuous than anywhere else in Europe, enabled the Nordic countries to construct societies which were, by the late twentieth century, among the most egalitarian and most prosperous in the world. Yet their very success made the Nordic countries vulnerable to external pressures.
The first half of the twentieth century was a period dominated by war and the anticipation of war. It was also a period of unprecedented ideological confrontation and economic competition among the European great powers.
Preface
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp xiii-xiv
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
I have been working on this book for a long time, and on various aspects of Scandinavian history for much longer. I can now appreciate what Professor W. R. Mead meant when he wrote in the preface to his Historical Geography of Scandinavia (1981) of ‘the recurrent fear that it is over ambitious – indeed naïve – to embark on such an undertaking’. I can also sympathise with his other reasons for writing more slowly than he had intended: the difficulty of keeping pace with Scandinavian scholarship, and concern for the opinion of colleagues in the Nordic countries and elsewhere. In some sections of the book I have been able to draw upon my own earlier publications. I owe much, however, to the work of others in the field, and am only too well aware of the limits of my own knowledge and expertise (my inability to read Finnish or Russian remains the most nagging defect).
During the writing of this book I have incurred many debts of gratitude. Research in foreign countries always involves expense, in the Nordic countries more than most. When I first visited Norway in 1976, as a penurious research student, Great Britain was in the grip of a sterling crisis and Norway was at the height of the oil boom. I recall going without food for longer periods than I could manage now. Since then I have become more affluent; the disparities between the British and Nordic currencies have diminished; and Norwegian cuisine has improved. At an age when I would not mind losing some weight, I can now visit Scandinavia without doing so.
5 - The Nordic countries between the wars
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 169-205
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Although they had made no direct contribution to the Allied victory, the Nordic countries were substantial net beneficiaries of the peace settlement. Their security had been enhanced by the destruction of Germany and Russia as great powers, apparently for the foreseeable future. The League of Nations, which derived in part from Scandinavian ideas and initiatives, offered a new approach to international security. All four countries saw the end of the war as an opportunity for territorial expansion. For Denmark, of course, it was a matter of regaining territory lost in 1864. Following a plebiscite in 1920, the northern part of Slesvig was returned to Denmark, leaving a small Danish minority to the south of the new frontier and a rather larger German minority to the north. Sweden laid claim to the Åland Islands. Having relied on German patronage in 1918, the Swedes turned in 1919 to the Paris peace conference, which then referred the question to the League of Nations. In 1921 the League decided that the islands should remain in Finnish possession but with a large measure of self-determination, and that they should also be demilitarised. Sweden was thus the only Nordic country which did not gain territorially at the end of the war; but Swedish discomfiture, though vocal for a while, was relatively short-lived.
Independent Finland sought to extend the historic frontiers of the Grand Duchy into East Karelia, the cradle of Finnish culture, and northward to the Arctic Ocean. The peacemakers gave Finland an Arctic port at Petsamo but refused to satisfy its designs on Karelia – a source of lasting resentment to Finnish nationalists.
Bibliography
- Patrick Salmon, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
-
- Book:
- Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890–1940
- Published online:
- 11 November 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 November 1997, pp 371-399
-
- Chapter
- Export citation